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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
.OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a cor-
poration, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS 
WIRTHLIN and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a 
partnership, doing business as Wright-Wirth-
lin Company, JOHN 0. SPECK, McDON-
ALD BROS., INC., a corporation; JOSEPH 
McDONALD; and KEITH L. KNIGHT, do-
ing business as Knight Realty Company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation; 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a body politic; the 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, a commission of Utah; ALEXAN-
DER BUILDING CORPORATION OF 
UTAH, a corporation; SHAW INC., a cor-
poration; SOUTHEAST INC., a corporation; 
SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA SHEP-
HERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK, do-
ing business as the Brockbank Realty and 
Construction Company; GEORGE H. 
SMEATH; MARY H. SMEATH, and J. K. 
THAYN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8206 
Defendant's Brief 
NATURE OF THE CASE AS IT AFFECTS THE 
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT'S INTEREST 
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
was organized in September of 1951 under Title 79, 
Chapter 9, U.C.A. 1953, for the purpose of furnishing 
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domestic water to the .major portion of Salt Lake County 
south of Salt Lake City. There are included within its 
boundaries six cities and towns and several public utili-
ties of which the plaintiff water company is one. It has 
through the issuance of bonds and the levying of taxes, 
expended over $1,000,000.00 for pipelines and has author-
ized an additional $1,275,000.00 in bonds. It has no 
present dispute with Salt Lake City and does not antici-
pate that any serious dispute will arise. It 'vould, how-
ever, be seriously handicapped in performing its public 
functions if Salt Lake City were here adjudged, as 
against us, to have the unrestricted power to engage in 
the retail water business within the boundaries of the 
Conservancy District. 
The case has three distinct phases. The first involves 
the nature of the right of Salt J_Jake City to sell its surplus 
water outside its limits. This involves the issue of 
whether the city, through the sale of surplus water be-
yond its limits, is subject to. regulation either by the 
courts or the Public Service Commission. We believe 
that Salt Lake City does have the power to sell its sur-
plus waters beyond its boundaries, but that in doing so 
it can not discriminate between customers, nor charge 
unreasonable rates; that it is either a "water corpora-
tion'', subject to regulation by the Public Service Com-
mission, or the courts have the power to prohibit dis-
crimination. 
The second phas,e of the case involves the power of 
a city to purchase and develop water and build facilities 
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to permit it to engage in the water business generally 
beyond its boundaries. A· city in pursuance of its muni-
cipal functions must develop water resources beyond its 
immediate needs. It would be logical to hold that a sur-
plus thus developed need not be wasted or left unused 
until the city's need develops. Sales of such a surplus 
beyond the city's boundaries are primarily for the benefit 
of the inhabitants ·of the city, and the sale beyond the 
boundaries is but an incident. This is far different from 
a situation where a city has all of its 'vater supplies in 
use and is compelled to buy water itself to meet its own 
needs. Notwithstanding the fact that it has no surplus, 
it buys water from some organization like a metropolitan 
water district for the purpose of reselling that water at 
a profit beyond its boundaries. This involves not only 
the acquisition of water to permit the city to engage in 
the water business for a profit beyond its limits, but 
also the power of a city to use its funds for development 
and extensions of its system within the County, not to 
permit it to market a surplus, but to permit it to stay in 
an expanding water business which proves profitable. 
Even though the city has 'the po"\ver to market its sur-
pluses built up to meet its reasonable needs, 've deny 
that any city has the power to engage in the vvater busi-
ness generally. 
The third phase of the case involves the respective 
power of adjoining public municipal districts. The 
power of the city to market its surplus water, as sug-
gested in phase 1 above, and the power of the city to 
engage in the water business beyond its boundaries, as 
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suggested by phase 2 above, might both be 11:pheld and 
still the court should hold that the city can not invade 
the territory of an adjoining city, improvement district 
or conservancy district, to compete with that district, in 
the performance of that district's public functions. 
The existence of municipal type districts in the State 
of Utah and their boundaries is something which is within 
the judicial knowledge of the court. In recent years popu-
lation shifts from cities to suburban areas has required 
the establishment of sewer systems, water systems and 
other utility services in unincorporated areas. These 
municipal districts are in most instances created in the 
unincorporated areas immediately adjacent to cities. 
They are _given the po\\~er of taxation and it is in most 
instances their sole and only function to develop and 
supply water or sewage facilities. If the adjoining cities 
can go into the area embraced in these districts, and 
engage in competing water and sewage business, it cer-
tainly would impair the ability of these districts to per-
form their established public functions. Such districts, 
in the main, are :financed through the issuance of revenue 
bonds. A revenue bond would be unmarketable if the 
system were confronted with the possibility of competi-
tion from adjoining cities. Thus on the third phase the 
district takes the position that it would be detrimental 
to the public interest for one municipal taxing district 
to have the authority to invade the terrtiory of another. 
We are filing this brief without knowing the posi-
tion which will be ta·ken by Salt Lake City in its brief, 
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and the extent of the power which it will claim. 'V e 
realize that the dismissal by the lower court was made 
without trial, and that the decision in the lower court 
probably is not on the merits. However, as the Supreme 
Court expresses the law in response to the issues raised 
by the appellants, principles of law will necessarily be 
decided, and they will be established as the law of the 
case binding upon us because we are a party. Because 
there is no existing dispute between the Conservancy 
District and Salt Lake City, there has been no effort on 
the part of either to frame appropriate pleadings to 
settle the respective powers of these two public organi-
zations to operate retail water systems in the Conserv-
ancy District area. We believe that the issue could be 
better presented to the court if the parties could have 
directed their pleadings toward an existing problem with 
all of the material facts being either alleged or proved. 
The matter is, however, of great importance to all of 
the municipal type districts, and many of the cities of 
the state, and as a party to this suit, we believe we must 
make our position known or run the risk of being forever 
foreclosed from so doing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE CITY HAS NO AUTHORITY TO GO 
BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES EXCEPT TO MAR-
KET A SURPLUS PRODUCT. 
We believe that by placing emphasis on the problem 
of Public Service Commission regulation, the appellants 
almost bypassed what is to the Conservancy District the 
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most important phase of this case. It involves the power 
of a city to go into the water business generally. To 
what extent may a city buy water from the Metropolitan 
Water District or other sources for the purposes of en-
gaging in commercial trade beyond its boundaries T 
We think it clear under the authorities that the City, 
in the absence of clear legislative grant, could not go 
beyond its boundaries at all. There are a few states which 
do uphold the power of a city to market its surplus prod-
uct in the absence of statutory authority, but the over-
\Vhelming weight of authority is to the contrary. Where, 
ho"rever, the City has no surplus and is attempting to 
buy \Yater to go beyond its limits to engage in the water 
business generally, the authorities are in harmony 
against such a power in the city. There is even a serious 
doubt that the I_;egislature could by express grant permit 
the city so to do. Cities are formed to provide the vari-
ous municipal functions for the benefit of their inhabi-
tants. They have no power to utilize city funds to build 
facilities and go into business outside the city. 
The subject matter has been generally diseussed by 
Dillon Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, Volume 3, 
Section 1299, wherein it is stated: 
''The purpose for which a municipality is au-
thorized to construct ·waterworks or to contract 
for a supply of \Vater is usually to supply its own 
needs and the needs of its inhabitants, and it may 
be laid down as a general rule that a grant of 
power to a municipality for these purposes gives 
it by implication no authority to enter into the 
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business of furnishing water to persons beyond 
the municipal limits. Nor does authority to pro-
vide water or light for its own use and for the use 
of its inhabitants authorize a municipality to go 
into the business of buying and selling water as a 
commodity to another municipality. But in the 
absence of any constitutional provision or prohi-
. bition, it is within the power of the Legislature to 
authorize a municipality, at least a.s an incident 
to the constr~tction and maintenance of its o~vn 
~cater works, to contract with neighboring muni-
cipalities to supply "\Vater to their inhabitants.'' 
Mc.Quillin on Corporations, 3rd Ed., Volume 12, Sec-
tion 35.34 states: 
''Grant of power generally to provide a water 
supply for the inhabitants of a municipality does 
not carry with it the right to furnish water to 
inhabitants in other territories, and generally it 
is held that a municipality which owns its water 
or light plant has no implied authority to furnish 
water or light beyond its territorial limits :r.= >1{: *. '' 
McQuillin does note a minority rule where the po,ver 
to go beyond the boundaries to sell a surplus product 
may be implied in the absence of a statutory prohibition. 
The Utah Supreme Court has had numerous occa-
sions to consider the question of the implied power of a 
city to do various things. The rule of construction was 
recently stated in Nasfell v. Ogden City, (Utah) 249 P. 
(2d) 507. In that case Ogden had assumed that because 
cities had been given the power to regulate streets and 
the parking of vehicles for a fee, together with the gen-
·era.l power to enforce those powers, that the city neces-
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sarily had the implied power to pass an ordinanee, estab-
lishing a rule of evidence binding on the c.ourt. The 
Supreme Court held that no such implied power existed 
and said: 
"We are committed to the principle that cities 
have none of the elements of sovereignty, that 
'any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concern-
ing the existence of the power is resolved by the 
courts against the corporation, (city) and the 
power denied,' and that grants of power to cities 
are strictly construed to the exclusion of implied 
powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out 
the purposes of the express powers granted.'' 
The court went on to enumerate numerous instances 
in which the attempted exercise of an implied power has 
been denied. This rule is so 'vell settled that there can 
be no doubt that it is the settled law in Utah. For a fairly 
recent case, see Nance c. Mayflower Cafe, 106 Utah 517, 
150 P. (2d) 773. The court quoted with approval from 
Dillon on Municipal Corporations that cities may exer-
cise the following powers and no others : First, those 
granted in express words. Second, those necessarily or 
fairly implied or incident to the power expressly granted 
and third, that the power is essential to the accomplish-
ment of the declared objections and purposes of the cor-
poration. It is noted that the powers thus implied are 
not simply those convenient but rather those indispens-
able, and that any fair, reasonable or substantial doubt 
concerning the existence of the power is resolved against 
the city and the power is denied. After quoting this rule 
from Dillon, the court noted that this rule has been 
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quoted with approval in at least three prior Utah cases, 
and that: 
''From these authorities it appears clear that 
cities have no inherent or original legislative 
po,ver .x· :!(• * if there is a reasonable doubt con-
cerning an existence of a particular power that 
doubt should be resolved against the city and the 
pov1er should be denied.'' 
See also, l)alt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah 504, 124 P. 
(2d) 537, where the rule is also stated and applied. 
There must, in order to uphold the power of the 
city to go in the water business generally in the County, 
be a. legislative grant of power for the city to so do. 
When 've turn to the statutes we find that by the provi-
sions of Section 10-8-14, that cities are granted the power 
to market their ''surplus product'' beyond city limits. 
By ordinary rules of statutory construction, the express 
grant of po,ver to market a surplus product by negative 
implication denies the power to market a product unless 
it is surplus. This section must, of course, also be read 
against the backdrop of other statutes and constitutiona~ 
provisions. There is an express constitutional prohibi-
tion against cities selling their water rights. See Article 
XI, Section 6. Contracts to suply water without regard 
to it being surplus water have been held to be void as 
violative of this section. See East Mill Creek Water Com-
pany v. City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P. (2d) 863, in which the 
court expressly said that this Article XI, Section 6 would 
prohibit the city from performing an agreement to de-
liver an unlimited quantity of water to inhabitants of an 
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area without the city limits. That a city could not sell 
either directly or indirectly any water right or water 
source, and that a contract to deliver to non-residents at 
points without the city limits all the water which those 
individuals wanted would be violative of this constitu-
tional provision. 
There is a general grant of power to cities to appro-
priate moneys to acquire property for the benefit of the 
city both within and without its corporate boundaries, 
and to do all things in relationship thereto as natural 
persons. See Section 10-8-2. The section goes on to 
provide that it shall be deemed a corporate purpose to 
appropriate money for any purpose "'"hich in the ''judg-
ment of the Board of Commissioners will provide for 
the safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity 
and improve the morals, peace, order, comfort and con-
venience of the inhabitants of the city." This is a very 
broad grant of power and still the Supreme Court has 
held that the mere earning of a profit from commercial 
trade does not come within it. Thus in .A1nerican Petro-
leum Co., et al. v. Ogden City, 90 Utah 465, 62 P. 2d 557, 
the Supreme Court denied to Ogden the po'\\rer to sell 
gasoline. The city urged that under the terms of the 
above noted statute (10-8-2) it would promote the gen-
eral welfare, etc. of the people. The court said: 
"It is contended that this (the statute) au-
thorizes the buying and selling of gasoline by the 
municipality if for the convenience, comfort, and 
prosperity of the inhabitants. It was held in Salt 
Lake City v. Sutter, supra, that this proviso was 
10 
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limited by the clauses and provisions of the law 
which specify the particular purposes for which 
ordinances may be passed.'' 
The court went on to say that the power to enter into 
the various commercial enterprises of this type would 
have to come from the Legislature, and even suggested 
that there may be some doubt that the Legislature has 
the constitutional po\ver to confer it, because it says ''as 
to the existence of such power in the Legislature we pass 
no opini?n. '' 
The court also construed this section in Bohn v. Salt 
Lake City, 79 Utah 121, \vhere the city in order to pro-
mote employment during the Depression had set up un-
usual contract specifications vvhich would increase the 
cost of the project but which would require the employ:.. 
ment of more men. 1-\.gain the sections of the statute 
were noted, including the express power to construct 
sewers. The court said : 
''This express grant of power carries with it 
those iNcidental powers necessarily and fairly 
implied.'' 
The court also noted the general welfare clause quoted 
above. The court then held that the city had no power 
under the general welfare clause and the clause permit-
ting it to install sewers to do so in a manner which woulcl 
promote employment and increase the cost of the system. 
The court has also held that the express power to con-
struct, maintain, and operate street railways, carries 
with it no implied power to operate motor busses, [Ttah 
11 
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Rapid Transit Company v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 
P. 2d 3. In view of these numerous holdings by our Utah 
Supreme Court, we submit that the following is settled 
law: 
1. That the City has no inherent powers of sover-
eignty and can do nothing unless authorized so to do by 
the Legislature. 
2. That where a power is granted by the Legisla-
ture the grant of power should be strictly construed. 
3. That if there is any reasonable d?ubt concerning 
the existence of a power, the power should be denied. 
In the instant case there is a constitutional provision 
which expressly prohibits cities from selling beyond 
their limits water in unlimited quantities, East Mill Creek 
v. Salt Lake City, supra. There is an express statute 
which authorizes the cities to sell their ''surplus product'' 
beyond their boundaries. By negative implication the 
Legislature has thus said that they can not sell beyond 
their boundaries anything but a surplus product. Cer-
tainly, if a grant of power to operate street railways 
carries no power to operate motor busses, the power to 
sell a ''surplus product'' does not by implication grant 
the power to sell something which is not surplus. That is, 
the power to buy water for resale. 
It is fundamental that cities are organized for the 
benefit of their inhabitants. The sale of surplus water 
beyond their boundaries is primarily for the benefit of 
their inhabitants. The development of a water supply 
12 
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beyond the existing need is proper civic planning, and 
rather than permit the water to run to waste or remain 
unused it can be sold. The development of the supply 
is for the primary purpose of meeting the needs of the 
city. Its sale as a surplus product is purely incidental. 
We seriously doubt that the Legislature could, under our 
constitutional provisions, even grant the power to the 
city to engage in commercial trade beyond its boundaries. 
In the -'-lmerican Petroleum v. Ogden City case, supra, 
the Supreme Court expressed the same doubt. The gen-
eral rule against cities engaging in commercial trade is 
stated in McQuillin on Corporations, Section 36.02, page 
702, as follows : 
''The objective of the creation of a municipal 
corporation is that it may perform certain local 
functions as a subordinate branch of government 
and while it is invested with full power to do 
everything necessarily incident to a proper dis-
charge thereof, no right to do more can ever be 
implied. In the absence of express legishitive 
sanction, it has no authority to engage in any 
independent business enterprise or occupation 
such as is usually pursued by private individuals.'' 
There follows in McQuillin on Corporations numerous 
examples of cases where cities have attempted to engage 
in commercial trade and the power to do so has been 
denied. There are several cases in which the distinction 
which we seek here to make has been noted and upheld 
in other states. 
In Burough of East Newa.rk v. New York and New 
Jersey Water Supply Company, 67 N.J. 265, 57 Atl. 1051, 
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Jersey City·,vas buying water from a private water com-
pany for $35.00 per million gallons and selling it to other 
towns for $90.00 per million gallons. The city was not 
selling its surplus water but was buying water for resale. 
The court held that the city had no such power. The case 
holding is summarized in an annotation in 49 A.L.R., 
page 1243, as follows : 
"A municipal corporation which buys all of 
its water from a water company has no power to 
sell a portion of the water so acquired to another 
municipal corporation, though it may be author-
ized by statute·to sell waters to neighboring muni-
cipalities· when it has a water supply of its own 
in excess of its needs.'' 
In Gage v. lVilmette, 233 Ill. Appeals 123, it was 
held that while by express statute a city owning and 
operating a plant for supplying water to its inhabitants 
and taking water from its original source may sell water 
"both within and without the city", a city buying its 
water from another city is without power to resell that 
water or distribute it outside its limits. 
In a recent case of State v. Wylie, (Washington) 182 
P. 2d 706, a public utility district, which is a municipal 
type district in Washington, was by express statute 
authorized to sell electric power, both \vithin and without 
the confines of the district. Pursuant to this power, it 
had the right to purchase property, both within and 
without the district. The district in question encompassed 
only one county. It proposed to buy the facilities of a 
private utility which served eighteen counties. The Su-
14 
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preme Court of the State of Washington held that not-
withstanding the express grant of power to serve beyond 
its boundaries, the district had no power to go beyond its 
boundaries on such a grandiose scale. It noted that its 
primary purpose must necessarily be the furnishing of 
power to its own inhabitants. If it had a surplus it could 
as ~n incident to this primary power sell the same beyond 
its boundaries. The court's opinion is very long and 
toward the end of the opinion at page 726, it summarized 
its opinion and said: 
"Much that has been said has been by way of 
explanation and argument, and, therefore, we 
summarize the points that are here decided. 
''The primary purpose of the power granted 
to a public utility district "' * *· is to furnish the 
district, and the inhabitants thereof, with electric 
current for all uses, and, as an incident thereto, 
it may furnish any other persons, including public 
and private corporations, within or without its 
limits, with such current for all uses. 
''The right given under subsection (d) to con-
struct, condemn, etc. :~: * * is subject to the limita-
tion that the facilities acquired must not be un-
reasonably large or entirely inappropriate for the 
accomplishment of that purpose.'' 
The court held, therefore, that even though the com-
pany was proceeding within the express letter of the law, 
it violated the principle of municipal government for the 
district to go in business almost throughout the state. 
The primary purpose of furnishing its own inhabitants 
would be pushed to the background and the sale beyond 
the boundaries would be the primary purp9se. Even the 
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dissenting judges approve the principle, but denied that 
it was applicable to the facts there stated. On page 739 
one of the dissenting judges said : 
''The majority opinion impugns the good faith 
of the public utility district, and everyone con-
cerned in the plan by ascribing only to them an 
incidental purpose of serving the electric needs 
of their district, and arbitrarily holding that their 
primary purpose is to go into the electric business 
in territory beyond their boundaries. Neither the 
record nor common sense warrants such a hold-
ing.'' 
See also Dyer v. N eu;port, 123 Ky. 203, 204 S.W. 25. 
It ·was there said that \Vhile a city may sell its excess 
water to outsiders, it can not contract to extend its system 
of waterworks to an adjoining city. In this case, Clifton, 
an adjoining municipality, passed an ordinance pro-
viding for the sale of the franchise for 40 years and for 
laying water lines and mains in its streets. As was re-
quired by the Kentucky Constitution, bids were called 
for by advertisement. The City of Newport submitted 
a bid and was the successful bidder. It was held that 
Newport could dispose of its surplus supply for its ad-
vantage, but it would not go into the business of main-
taining works and operating franchises in and for the 
benefit of an adjoining municipality without express 
legislative authority. 
In Nephi v. Telluride, Case No. 3516, before the Pub-
lic Service Commission of Utah, the Commission pro-
hibited the City of Nephi from purchasing electric power 
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from Utah Power & Light for resale beyond its bound~ 
ar1es. 
See also, Hyre v. Brown,. 102 W. Va. 505, 135 S.E. 
656, 49 A.L.R. 1230, where the court said: 
' ' The exception to the general rule is that 
there is implied power to furnish an excess com-
modity to outs~ders where the city has such com-
modity in the exercise of an authorized proprie-
tary undertaking, under the theory that it is 'good 
business'. The instant case does not fall within 
the exception noted, for there is no suggestion 
herein of surplus commodity, or good business.' 
We respectfully submit that the city can not engage 
in commercial trade simply because it thinks it can make 
a profit thereon. It can not use City money to build 
facilities in the County except to market a surplus 
product developed for the primary purpose of meeting 
the future needs of its people. Since the inhabitants of 
the City have the primary demand on its water, because 
of Article XI, Section 6, people outside the city are al-
ways subjected to the risk that they will build their 
homes in reliance on a water supply which the City may 
be required to take from them. Even the Metropolitan 
Water District is required to give the City the prior 
right to purchase its water. It is thus both detrimental 
to the welfare of the people of Salt Lake City and to the 
people it serves to have it engage in commercial trade 
beyond its boundaries. 
It is contrary to fundamental concepts of Govern-
ment for cities and governments generally to engage in 
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commercial trade. If the City finds it profitable to go 
into the water business in the County because it has a 
good water department, there is no logical reason why 
it can not use its street department to engage in the 
private contracting business in the County or through-
out the State. It has trucks and various other types of 
road building equipment. It must maintain that equip-
ment to maintain its streets. It might be able to devote 
that equipment to the building of gutters, sidewalks and 
streets in private subdivisions in the County, or it might 
even build roads for the State Road Commission throug4-
out the State. The people of Salt· Lake City would be 
benefited if this proved to be profitable, but it is funda-
mental that the City c.an not do this, and it is equally 
fundamental that it should not be permitted to engage 
in the.sale of water, power or any other commodity except 
as an incident to the disposal of its surplus supply built 
up to meet the reasonable future needs of the City. Even 
the case of Muir v. Murray City, 55 Utah 360, 186 P. 433, 
wherein the power to market a surplus beyond its bound-
daries is upheld, there is a strong implication that the 
City can not engage in commercial trade except for the 
disposal of a surplus product. This problem is of wide 
public importance. We think the allegations of the com-
plaint fairly allege that the City is purchasing water from 
Metropolitan for resale in the County. If the court deems 
it necessary_ to decide this issue, it would certainly be 
detrimental to the interests of the Conservancy District 
if the court were to uphold the general power of the City 
to go into the County and develop water supplies and 
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purchase water sources and water itself for the sole pur-
pose of engaging in commercial trade within the confines 
of the Conservancy District and in competition with it. 
II. EVEN IN THE SALE OF ITS SURPLUS WATER 
BEYOND ITS BOUNDARIES THE CITY IS SUB-
JECT TO REGULATION. 
(a) Regulation by the Courts. 
The appellants here have confined the question of 
regulation to regulation by the Public Service Commis-
sion. We think the principle is broader than that. Even 
if the court should conclude that under our constitutional 
provisions and our statutes, the City is beyond the juris-
diction of the Public Service Commission, certainly it is 
not without any restraint. There is a well-established 
common law rule that one who engages in a business 
affected. with a public interest must not adopt unreason-
able rates or rules and regulations. There .is inherent 
in the powers of the courts the jurisdiction to prohibit 
abuses by one who has engaged in the furnishing of 
utility service. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already committed 
itself on this doctrine. In the case of Home Owners' Loan 
Corporation v. Logan City, 97 Utah 235, 92 P. ( 2d) 346, 
the court held that cities, even in the sale of water to 
their own inhabitants must adopt reasonable rules and 
regulations or otherwise the rule is void. This case must 
be considered against the background of the constitu-
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tional proVIsion, Article. VI, Section 29, which grants 
to cities home rule over their municipal functions. It 
also must be considered in the light of the statute 
(10-7-10, U.C.A. 1953), which expressly provided that a 
city would not be required to furnish water for use in 
any house unless the application for service was signed 
by the owner, and the following sections which permitted 
the city to terminate service for failure to comply with 
the rules, and partictiarly Section 10-7-14, which pro-
vided: 
''Every city and to,vn may enact ordinances, 
rules and regulations for the management and 
conduct of the water,vorks system owned or con-
trolled by it.'' 
· Notwithstanding the constitutional prov1s1on and 
these express statutory powers, the Supreme Court 
issued a 'vrit of mandamus to compel a. town .to connect 
one of its inhabitants to t~e town system. In so doing 
the court said : 
''In the very recent case of Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, supra, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land had before it the same situation as exists in 
the present case. Mandamus was brought by the 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation to compel the 
City of Baltimore to supply water to certain 
premises owned by the plaintiff. The lower court 
dismissed the petition, and an appeal was taken. 
On appeal the judgment of the lower court was 
reversed, the Court of Appeals holding that 'if 
the purpose and intent' of the municipal water 
company's rules 'was to authorize the corpora-
tion to discontinue its service to property because 
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the owner thereof failed or refused to pay the 
water rent due for service to a former owner, the 
rule was unreasonable and void. (Citing cases)' 
''The theory on which mandamus will lie ap-
pears to be that an applicant is not unde·r the duty 
of complying with unreasonable rules or unlawful 
regulations in order to obtain the service of a 
public service corporation (or a municipality act-
ing in the same capacity). The fact that he may 
submit to such unlawful regulation by paying the 
assessed charges under protest and suing to re-
cover the money thus paid on the grounds that the 
regulation was unlawful, does not establish that 
he has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at 
law. Mandamus was, therefore proper in this 
case.'' 
In view of this holding, there. can be no doubt that 
Utah is presently committed to the doctrine that cities 
in the furnishing of service even to their own residents 
must adopt rules and regulations which are reasonable 
and not discriminatory. If such a rule is correct as to 
service to its inhabtiants, a fortiori the rule must be 
applied to service beyond its boundaries where in the 
more literal sense it is embarking in the utility business 
as distinguished from the performance of a municipal 
function. The rule that courts have the inherent power 
to enforce the common law rule is followed by many 
states. A corporation which devotes its property to the 
furnishing of a utility service is affected by a public 
interest, and since the very early case of M unn v. Illinois, 
94 U.S. 113, 24 L.Ed. 77, the courts have upheld their 
right to regulate the rates. Our Utah Supreme Court 
in Utah Power db Light Company v. Public Service Com-
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
m~ssion, 107 ·utah 155, 15.2 P. (2d) 542, commented on the 
Munn v. Illinois case, and stated the rule as follo"rs: 
"It was further stated (in Munn v. Illinois) 
that 'Property does become clothed with a public 
interest when used in a manner to make it of 
public consequence, and affect the community at 
large.' 
''And when devoted to public use, the owner in 
effect grants the public an interest and must sub-
ject .himself to regulation. '' · 
Thus in Home Owners Loan case, supra, the Supreme 
Court squarely held that this common law rule applies 
to cities engaged in the sale of water. The subject is 
covered generally by an annotation in 127 A.L.R., be-
ginning at page 101, wherein it is stated: 
.. ''The power of courts to pass upon the reason-
ableness of the rates fixed for services rendered 
by a municipally owned or operated public utility 
has been more often recognized in affirmative 
action in that regard than discussed.'' 
Numerous cases are cited wherein courts have 
assumed the power to regulate utility fees by munici-
palities. 
In a rece11t case, to-wit, City of Texarkam,a v. Wig-
gins, (Texas) 246 S.W. (2d) 622, the court squarely hel~ 
that it had the power to regulate rates of a municipal 
corporation as to sales beyond its boundaries. The City 
·of Texarkana was selling ·water beyond its boundaries. 
It charged one rate for service within the city and a rate 
double the city rate ·for service without the city. The 
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court said that there is a common law rule that one 
engaged in rendering a service affected with a l>u~lic 
interest may not discriminate in charges or services as 
between persons similarly· situated; that this common 
law rule is one of long standing and is so well recognized 
that no citation of authority to support it is necessary. 
The court in a rather detailed opinion held that the 
common law rule was in effect in T-exas and that an 
ordinance charging double rates to people outside the 
city was void unless the city on new trial could show a 
reasonable basis for the difference in rates. 
We take the position that the City, in sales beyond 
its boundary is subject either to (a) regulation by the 
Public Service Commission, or (b) to the common law 
rule that one engaged in a service affected with a public 
interest must establish reasonable rates, and can not 
discriminate or establish unreasonable regulations. As 
to regulation by the Public Service Commission, the Utah 
Commission has already so held in the Bayles case, infra. 
As to common law rule, the Utah Supreme Court has 
already applied it in the Logan City case, supra. 
(b) Regulation by Public Service Commission. 
We concur with the argument of appellants to the 
effect that a city in selling beyond its boundaries should 
be regulated by the Public Service Commission. 
In the absence of statute as noted above, most of 
the states hold that a city has no power to sell its surplus 
water beyond its boundaries. (McQuillin on _Corpora .. 
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tions, Third Edition, Section 35.34). ·There is however, 
an express statute in Utah, Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953. 
This section provides that cities may sell and deliver its 
surplus water not required by the city or its inhabitants 
to others beyond its limits. This power has been upheld 
in the case of Muir v. Murray City, 55 Utah 568, 186 P. 
483, and was recognized in Hyde Park v. Chwmbers, 99 
Utah 118, 104 P. (2d) 220. The general power can not, 
therefore, be denied. 
While the Utah Court has held in Hom.e Owners 
Loan v. Logarn City, supra, that cities are subject to 
regulation by the courts, the Supreme Court has never 
squarely passed on the question of whether the Public 
Service Commission may regulate cities in the sale of 
utility products beyond the city limits. The matter has, 
however, been squarely presented to our Public Service 
Commission in Re. Bayles, et al., P.U.R. (1926) A, page 
731, and the problem was incidentally involved in the 
case of Utah Power & Light and Telluride Power Com-
pany v. Public Service Commission of Utah, and Nephi 
City, ______ Utah ______ , 249 P. (2d) 951. 
The Utah Authorities: 
In re Ba.yles, a group of eighteen individuals desired 
to purchase power from the City of Parowan. This 
group, all of which resided outside the· city, proposed 
to construct a power line to the city limits and to there 
purchase power for t_ransmission and use it at their 
farms. At first ,the City of Parowan was not made a 
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party. The Public Service Commission indicated that it 
had no jurisdiction over the eighteen individuals, be-
cause they were not purporting to go into the business 
of selling power ; they were merely going to purchase 
power for their own use, and consequently were not 
under the jurisdiction of the Commission. The City of 
Parowan was then made a party. The eighteen indi-
viduals were residing within the franchise area of Dixie 
Power Company, a public utility. The Commission 
prohibited the sale of power by Parowan City to the 
eighteen individuals. In so holding the Commission said: 
''The evidence was to the effect that the peti-
tioners proposed to engage in the .power business 
as a personal matter, not as a public service cor-
poration, but merely to serve their several farms. 
''This being so, the Commission would have no 
jurisdiction whatever. It would be nothing more 
than a mutual arrangement among these indi-
viduals to purchase power from the city and then 
to use it as they would have a perfect right to do 
for pumping water for their separate farms. 
''On the other hand, Parowan City, in selling 
power to the petitioners, as individuals, would, 
however, come under the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission. 
''Similarly, the Dixie Power Company would 
be "\\rithin its legal right as a protestant against 
the sale of power by Parowan City beyond the 
corporation limits. 
"After some discussion it was agreed that 
Parowan City be made a party defendant in the 
case, and it was so ordered by the Commission. 
* * :11: 
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·"While the·lower·r·ate by Parowan to Bayles 
and others would have inured to its advantage for 
the present, .the Commission is compelled to take 
into consideration the effect that granting this 
petition would have upon the users of power and 
light in the balance of the territory occupied by 
the Dixie Power Company. • • * 
"It being the duty of Parowan to serve its 
inhabitants first, this contract would exist only 
until.such time as a market developed for the sur-
plus power within the corporate limits. 
''If the original petition were granted, Paro-
wan City, in this special instance, would, with 
res.pect to its sale· of power to others than the 
inhabitants thereof, become a utility, proposing 
to -enter the field already occupied by another 
utility.'' 
Thus, the sale to Bayles, et al. was prohibited and 
the Public Service Commission of Utah expressly ruled 
that· in the sale of power by Parowan to customers be-
yond its boundaries it was a public utility, subject to 
regulation by the Public· Service Commission, and that 
it could not be permitted to invade the franchise area of 
the Dixie Power Company. 
In the case of Utah Power ct Light Company and 
Telluride Power Company v. Public Service Commission 
of Utah and Nephi City, supra, Nephi City wanted to 
buy power from Utah Power & Light Company, which 
was located some seven miles from the Nephi City boun-
dary .. Nephi City was completely surrounded by the 
franchise area of Telluride Power Company. Nephi City 
o"\\rned its own municipal plant, but needed to acquire 
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supplemental power. It had for a period of years been 
purchasing from Telluride, but on the expiration of its 
contract with Telluride it desired to buy its supplemental 
power from Utah Power & Light Company. The Bayles 
case was cited in the briefs by Telluride as an authority 
prohibiting Utah Power & Light Company from selling 
power to Nephi. The brief of Nephi distinguished the 
Bayles case, on the grounds that it involved a sale·by a 
city outside of its boundaries, while the Nephi case in-
volved an effort by Nephi to buy power only to serve 
within its boundaries. The Supreme Court had no neces-
sity for passing on the point raised here, but its opinion, 
which is carefully worded, is restricted to the right of 
Nephi City to have ''self rule within its boundaries.'' 
The court quoted with approval from a case decided by 
the Idaho Public Service Commission. Idaho, by statute, 
had granted cities self rule, as our constitution does, and 
the case was placed squarely on the grounds that muni-
cipalities had been exempted from the jurisdiction of 
the Public Service Commission as effectively as though 
the territory 11 within the municipality'' had been lifted 
bodily and set down without the confines of the State. 
In other words, the ''self rule'' granted to the cities was 
limited to service within Nephi's own territory. 
Nephi City was selling some power beyond its boun-
daries, and the file, which is No. 3516, before the Com-
mission, reflects an objection on the part of Telluride 
to Nephi's purchase of power for resale beyond its 
boundaries. The Public Service Commission, in the issu-
ance of its order, expressly limited the City to the pur-
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chase of power for use by its own inhabitants within 
its own area. The Commission also ordered ''that the 
contract between Nephi City and Utah Power must con-
form to the Commission's rules and must be approved 
by the Commission. '' 
It would, therefore, appear that our Public Service 
Commission is presently committed to the doctrine that 
when a city purports to serve beyond its boundaries it 
loses its "immunity" from regulation and becomes sub-
ject to the rules and regulations of the Public Service 
Commission, and the Supreme Court has been careful in 
its application of the "self rule" doctrine, to restrict 
the self rule to service within the territorial limit~ of 
the city. 
Authorities from other States: 
The general power of a city to sell beyond its boun-
daries and the power of public service commissions over 
such sales has been a frequent subject of litigation 
throughout the nation. The subject is .treated generally 
in McQuillin on Corporations, 3rd Edition, Volume 12, 
Sections 34.146 and 35.34, and is annotated in 127 A.L.R. 
94. In the early cases the authorities seem to be quite 
uniform in their holding that when a city engages in th~ 
sale of its surplus product beyond the city limits it 
becomes a utility, subject to regulation. See for example, 
the collection of cases in the Public Utility Reports 
Digest, under "Municipal Plants", subsection 11. The 
Arizona Public Service Commission rather consistently 
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held that cities selling beyond their boundaries were 
subject to regulation by the· Utilities Commission. See, 
for example, Harber v. Phoenix, P.U.R. (1918) D 342. 
Thereafter amendments were made to the Arizona sta-
tutes. The court thus noted in City of Phoenix v. Wright, 
(Arizona) 80 P. (2d) 390, that in 1934 the Legislature 
had expressly provided that any municipality had the 
power to sell outside its limits. The argument was made 
that even though they had the power to sell beyond their 
boundaries those sales became subject to the Public 
Service Commission regulation. The court said this was 
a plausible but not tenable argument, because of the 
provision of Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution, 
which expressly excluded municipal corporations from 
regulation by the Public Service Commission. Arizona 
has since consistently held that cities selling beyond their 
boundaries are not subject to regulation by the Public 
Service Commission. 
In Colorado the Supreme Court held in La.Mar v. 
Wiley, 80 Colo. 18, 248 Pac. 1009 that the Commission and 
not the city has the power to :fix the rates of a munici-
pally owned public utility for service to customers out-
side the City. Thereafter the Public Service Commission 
consistently exercised jurisdiction over the various 
municipally owned plants furnishing services beyond 
their boundaries. See the P.U.R. Digest under the index 
''Municipal Plants'', Section 11. Then in City of Engle-
wood v. City and County of Denver, (Colorado) 229 P. 
(2d) 667, the court held that by reason of the wording 
of the Colorado statutes and Constitution, cities were 
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immune from· regulation by the utilities commission. 
The statute in question expressly provided that cities 
could sell water to outside consumers and then provided 
that the cities had the power ''to collect therefor such 
charges and upon such conditions arnd limitations as said 
towns and cities ma.y impose by ordinance.'' The Consti-
tution, Article V, Section 35, prohibited the delegation 
to any special commission, of the power to interfere with 
any municipal improvement. The court also was im-
pressed by the fact that the power of cities to sell beyond 
their boundaries was granted in 1911 and the Public 
Utilities Act was not enacted until 1913. The court was 
unwilling to consider the public utility act as an implied 
repeal of the legislative grant to cities of (a) the power 
to sell beyond their boundaries, and (b) the power to 
fix the rates to be charged and the conditions to be 
imposed by ordinance. 
In the State of Washington the Legislature in 1917 
granted cities power to extend water systems beyond 
their corporate limits and expressly provided that such 
portion of the system as extends beyond the corporate 
limits of the city "shall be operated at such prices and 
under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed 
by the Public Service Commission.'' In 1933 this was 
repealed and in its place it was provided that the muni-
cipality furnishing beyond its limits could by contract 
fix the terms upon which the outside distribution system 
will be installed and the rates and the manner of services 
rendered. In view of this express legislation, the Wash-
ington court held in West Side Improvement Club v. 
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Department of Public Service, (Washington), 58 P. (2d) 
350, that cities are beyond the control of the Public 
Service Commission. 
Thus, in the absence of a consideration of express 
statutes, Arizona, Washington and Colorado, in the be-
ginning, all had upheld the power of the Commission to 
regulate cities in sales beyond their boundaries. Later 
because of express legislative power on the part of cities 
to sell beyond their boundaries and to fix the rates for 
and the ter1ns of the services, they now deny the power 
of the Public Service Commission to regulate cities sell-
ing beyond their boundaries. 
There are, on the other hand, a great number of 
cases holding under the statutes of the States there in-
volved that cities do become subject to regulation by the 
Public Service Commission when they sell beyond their 
boundaries. 
In Kentucky a statute expressly provided that ''pub-
lic utilities'' means any person ''except a water district 
organized under Chapter 7 4, or a city who owns, controls, 
operates or manages any facility used or to be used for 
or in connection with the diverting * * * or furnishing 
of water to or for the public for compensation.'' It was 
argued that this express statutory exemption of cities 
exempted the city from control of the Public Service 
Commission. The Kentucky Supreme Court said in 
connection with supplying of electrical energy beyond 
the city in Olive Hill v. Public Service Co~mmission, 305 
Ky. 248, 203 S.W. (2d) 68, that: 
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''When the city supplies current outside its 
corporate limits its exemption as to rates and 
regulation by the Commission ceased and the city 
came within the jurisdiction of the Commission 
and was subject to such regulation by it.'' 
Later in Louisville Water Company v. Preston Street 
Road Water District, 256 S.W. (2d) 26, the court said 
that the identical principle should be applied in regard 
to the sale of water beyond the city boundaries. 
For other states upholding the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission to regulate cities insofar as 
sales beyond their corporate limits is concerned, see the 
Annotation in 127 A.L.R. at page 96, under the heading, 
"Where Service is Rendered Outside Corporate Limits". 
States upholding the power of regulation include Shirk 
v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557, 90 A.L.R. 688, 
(in which it was said that in supplying water to corpora-
tions and individuals outside the city applicable rates of 
a municipal plant are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission, although prescribed by city 
ordinance) ; V alcour v. Morrisville, 110 Vt. 93, 2 Atl. 
(2d) 312; Wheeling v. Benwood McMecham Water Com-
pany, 115 W. Va. 353, 176 S.E. 234; J. Greenbaum T·an-
ning Company v. Railroad Commission, 194 Wis. 634, 
217 N.W. 282. Also are cited commission decisions from 
Colorado, ~Iissouri, Montana, Nebraska and Utah. See 
also the recent Wyoming case, Moore v. Town of Evans-
ville, 95 P.U.R. (N.S.) 357, where the Wyoming Co~­
mission held that ''the Commission has jurisdiction over 
the extra-territorial service of a municipal plant, even 
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though the plant does not have statutory authority to 
render the same, and the fact that service may not be 
compelled by persons residing outside the corporate 
limits as a matter of right does not deprive the Com-
mission of that jurisdiction. '' 
In the same annotation (127 A.L.R. page 96) at page 
100 are collected cases denying the power of a commis-
sion to regulate the extra-territorial service of a city. 
The cases cited there include the Arizona and Washing-
ton cases referred to above. 
It thus appears that the authorities are not uniform. 
Each state has placed its decision on the particular 
statutes of that state. The Public Service Commission 
of Utah has already committed itself in the Bayles case 
and the Nephi City case to the proposition that it does 
have jurisdiction over the extra-territorial service of 
cities. The Utah court has carefully confined its rulings 
upholding the city's right to self rule t9 service within 
its boundaries and to its inhabitants. 
The Utah statutes certainly purport to cover mu-
nicipalities. In Section 54-2-1, subsection 3, corporations 
are expressly defined as including ''municipal corpora-
tions". It is also provided that "municipal corpora-
tions'' include cities, counties and towns. Subsection 26 
states that water corporations _include every corporation 
operating or managing a water system for public service. 
The Supreme Court noted, in City of St. George v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720, that 
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municipal "corporations are expressly included . in this 
act, and the contention that regulation of rates was 
limited to rates affecting the ''public'' as distinguished 
from municipal corporations· was without merit. 
It is further provided by Section 54-4-1 that the 
Commission is vested with power and jurisdiction to 
supervise and regulate every public utility in this State. 
Since public utili ties are · defined to include municipal 
corporations,: it would seem clear that the statutes pur-
port to regulate cities_ to the extent that the Legislature 
has the power to so do. The basis of the holdings that 
cities are beyond" regulation comes from the provisions 
of Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution which 
provides that the Legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission power to supervise ''any municipal 
improvement * * * or to perform any municipal func-
tions.'' The Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 
72 Uta.h 536, 271 Pac. 961, and Utah Power m Light v. 
Nephi City, · supra, cases, in which the Public Service 
Commission is denied the power to regulate cities are 
both expressly confined to service within the corporate 
limits to inhabitants of the city. 
The entire philosophy of public utility regulation 
was-to pro-hibit agencies not responsive to the will of the 
people by election or otherwise from monopolizing the 
field a.nd fixing rates at unreasonable levels or on ·a dis-
criminatory basis. Inhabitants within a city can prevent 
abuses through orderly elective proceedings, and even 
within a city where self rule is recognized and granted, 
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the courts have denied the City the right to discriminate 
or withhold service. Home Owners Loan v. Logan City, 
97 Utah 235, 92 P. ( 2d) 346, supra. 
Thus while the City has by express statutory pro-
vision been permitted to sell its "surplus" product be-
yond its boundaries, it would be contrary to sound public 
policy to permit the city to dump its surplus on the 
market in competition with established utilities or other 
municipal districts or to establish discriminatory or ex-
cessive rates. Certainly regulation in these extra-terri-
torial sales is desirable and reasonable. There is ample 
authority from other jurisdictions upholding the power 
of regulation under statutes similar to ours. The Public 
Service Commission has already in the Bayles case and 
the Nephi City case held that it has jurisdiction over 
cities on their outside sales, and this court should so 
hold. 
• 
III. THE CITY HAS NO POWER TO INVADE THE 
TERRITORY OF THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
AND IMPAIR THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT'S 
PERFORMANCE OF ITS FUNCTIONS. 
Salt Lake City was extensively in the water business 
in the East Bench Area 'vith many water lines and many 
customers when the Conservancy District was created. 
The Conservancy District at this moment does not have 
the financial strength nor a supply of water adequate to 
permit it to take over the entire territory presently being 
served by Salt Lake City. The two public bodies are not 
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engaging in ru1nous competition and have no existing 
quarrel. In submitting this brief we are not urging the 
court to pass upon issues involving the respective powers 
of the conservancy district and the city. We feel, how-
ever, that in passing on the issues raised by the appel-
lant, the court may determine that it is necessary to rule 
on the powers of the city as they relate to the other 
parties to this· suit. We doubt very much that the city 
would ever attempt to go beyond its boundaries with 
extensive new construction or attempt to usurp the 
public functions of the District. Certainly at the moment 
it is not doing so, and we hope that in its brief it will not 
assert that it has that power. We, nevertheless, feel 
that if this issue is to be ruled on by the court that it 
would be detrimental to the interests of the Conservancy 
district for the City to be given the power to enter the 
District and to usurp its functions. It must be remem-
bered that the Conservancy District has as its primary 
function the supplying of water to inhabitants. But for 
that function it would have no justification for its exist-
ence. Its general power to levy taxes is limited to that 
purpose and that purpose would be defeated if other 
arms of the State Government can compete with and 
usurp its functions within its own territory. 
Conservancy Districts are by statute granted nu-
merous express powers which are designed to enable 
them to supply water to both the incorporated and unin-
corporated areas within its limits, and the statutes them-
selves suggest that cities may not expand their boundar-
ies into the Conservancy District and compete for cus-
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tomers. The powers section of the Conservancy District 
act is Section 79-9-13, U.C.A. 1953, as the same was ex-
tensively amended by Laws of Utah 1953, Chapter 132. 
Subsection (b) grants the District power to con-
struct waterworks and facilities and to acquire water 
rights. Subsection (c) grants the power of eminent 
domain. Subsection (d) grants the power to maintain 
works along all public streets and highways, and pro-
hibits cities from requiring a permit for using or occupy-
ing the streets. Then in 1953 amendments were made 
dealing with the elimination of competition between 
cities and conservancy districts. Subsection ( q) ex-
pressly provides that conservancy districts may sell 
water to individual customers and fix the rates therefor. 
But this grant of power contains the proviso: 
"that no such sale of water for domestic or culi-
nary use shall be made to a customer located 
within the limits of an incorporated municipality 
at the time of the creation of the district and at 
the time of the service without the consent of such 
municipality.'' 
Subsection (q) of the 1953 amendment was enacted 
with the problems of Salt Lake County and Weber 
County conservancy districts in mind. Each of them 
embraces within its limits numerous incorporated cities 
and towns. The likelihood of the conservancy district 
going into the retail water business within the confines 
of those cities and towns presented an immediate prob-
lem, because some of the cities and towns do not own 
their own water systems. These districts were con-
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fronted with the problem of cities expanding their boun-
daries into the· district in competition with the District. 
It was thus provided that the Conservancy District could 
not' sell direct to individual customers within the existing 
boundaries ·of existing towns without the consent of the 
town. It was ·recognized,· however, that town boundaries 
might expand. If the town expanded its boundaries into 
an area not being served.by the Conservancy District at 
the time of the territorial expansion, then that area also 
. . 
could only be served retail by the district if the City 
consented. It was also recognized that Conservancy Dis-
tricts might be selling to inP.ividual customers immedi-
ately adjacent to a town but outside the present town's 
limits, that the town would expand to take in that area 
and try to exclude the District. Therefore, subsection 
( q) provides that no consent of the municipality would 
be needed if at the ·time of the ere a tion of the district 
and at the time service was established the area wa.s 
outside the town. Thus, the Legislature had at least one 
phase of this problem in mind when subsection ( q) was 
adopted. The intentionto eliminate competition between 
conservancy districts and towns which they embrace or 
adjoin in the service of water on a retail basis to indi-
vidual customers is certainly expressed. 
In Long v. Town of Thatcher, (Arizona.) 153 P. (2d) 
1953, the Town of Thatcher proposed to buy an existing 
"\Vater system. This system. served the Town of Thatcher 
and also the Town ·of Safford. The Town of Thatcher 
proposed to issue revenue bonds to acquire the system,. 
38 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and proposed to operate the same both within its own 
boundaries and within the Town of Safford. 
The Arizona statutes expressly provided that a 
municipality could engage in any business or enterprise 
that a person, firm or corporation may engage in by 
virtue of a franchise from the municipality. The statutes 
also gave it po"rer to construct within or without its 
corporate limits and to operate and maintain any utility 
undertaking and to purchase water rights. The court 
noted that there could be no question concerning the 
right of a municipality to operate outside its corporate 
limits. The court then noted that a very important 
matter to be considered in this case was that the Town 
of Safford, under Arizona law, when accepting its elec-
tric power from the Town of Thatcher, would be entitled 
to only the surplus power of Thatcher. The Town of 
Thatcher would also be immune from paying taxes to 
the Town of Safford. The court then held that the sta-
tute which gave the town of Thatcher its power to engage 
in any utility business within or without its corporate 
limits did not give it the power to invade the corporate 
limits of another municipality. Both the utility and the 
Town of Thatcher were, therefore, enjoined from com-
pleting the sale. 
The same principle was applied in the case of City 
of New Braunfels v. City of San .Antonio, 212 S.W. (2d) 
817. Several cases, including the above cited Arizona 
case, are· analyzed and then the court said: 
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"We repeat our holding that the City of San 
Antonio has no lawful right to interfere with or 
encroach upon any incidental or statutory power 
or duty belonging to the City of New Braunfels. 
Should it attempt to do so, the courts will be open 
to grant redress.'' 
It is detrimental to the people of any area to be 
dependent upon a surplus supply of water. When the 
surplus is needed by the City, the City has a preferential 
right to take it and a duty to its citizens to take it. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted: (1) That 
cities can not go beyond their boundaries to engage in 
commercial trade and buy and sell water; (2) that even 
on its surplus product, it is subject (a) to regulation by 
the courts and (b) to regulation by the Public Service 
Commission; and (3) that it can not without the consent 
of a municipal district invade its territory and usurp 
its functions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorney for The Salt Lake 
County f!Vater Conservancy 
District 
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
